The Supreme Court puts border judges back in their lane



For years, America’s immigration policy has been determined less by the elected branches of government than by a handful of federal district judges. Presidents proposed policies, Congress enacted statutes, and almost inevitably, a single judge somewhere in the country would issue an order purporting to suspend those policies nationwide.

That era may finally be drawing to a close.

Federal judges possess neither the democratic legitimacy of Congress nor the political accountability of the president.

The Supreme Court’s two immigration decisions issued last week mark an important turning point — not simply because they uphold significant Trump administration immigration policies, but because they reaffirm a more fundamental constitutional principle: Immigration policy belongs primarily to the political branches, not the judiciary.

The court’s decisions addressed different questions: Mullin v. Doe concerned the executive’s authority over Temporary Protected Status, while Mullin v. Al Otro Lado involved the government’s ability to regulate when and how aliens arriving at the border may invoke asylum procedures.

Both opinions reject the increasingly common assumption that federal judges may freely substitute their policy preferences for those of Congress and the president in matters of immigration.

That conclusion should surprise no one familiar with the Constitution or with the current court’s commitment to adhere to its original meaning.

Article I gives Congress authority over naturalization and immigration. Article II charges the president with faithfully executing the immigration laws and conducting the nation’s foreign affairs. The judiciary’s role is different. Courts are supposed to resolve concrete legal disputes — not make immigration policy. For too long, however, that distinction has been blurred.

Beginning during the first Trump administration and accelerating in recent years, nationwide injunctions or nationwide class actions have become the preferred weapon of litigants seeking to defeat executive policies with which they disagree. A single district judge can effectively veto the actions of the elected branches for the entire nation, often within days of a complaint being filed and long before appellate review. Nothing in the Constitution contemplates such extraordinary judicial power.

Federal judges possess neither the democratic legitimacy of Congress nor the political accountability of the president. Their authority extends only to deciding the cases before them and granting relief necessary to protect the specific parties before the court. They were never intended to function as a continuing supervisory council over every major policy dispute in the country. Last week’s decisions reflect a welcome recognition of that important constitutional principle.

Immigration, perhaps more than any other area of law, requires political judgment. Decisions concerning border security, humanitarian protection, foreign relations, labor markets, and national sovereignty inevitably involve competing policy considerations that courts are poorly equipped — and constitutionally unauthorized — to balance.

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Reasonable people may disagree about how policy judgments in the area of immigration should be resolved. Americans have long debated the proper scope of asylum protections, the wisdom of Temporary Protected Status, and the best means of securing the southern border.

But under our constitutional system, such decisions are supposed to occur in Congress, at the White House, and ultimately at the ballot box — not through nationwide decrees issued by unelected trial judges.

Critics will undoubtedly portray the Supreme Court’s two rulings as victories for one political party or another. That misses the larger point. The real winner is the constitutional separation of powers.

When courts respect the limits of judicial authority, they strengthen rather than weaken the rule of law. Judicial modesty is not judicial abdication. Courts remain fully empowered to decide actual cases, interpret statutes, and enforce constitutional guarantees. What they are not empowered to do is assume responsibility for making national immigration policy, a distinction that protects everyone.

The precedents the Supreme Court established will not apply only to Republican presidents or conservative policies. They will constrain future courts considering the actions of Democrat administrations as well. Constitutional principles endure precisely because they are not dependent upon agreement with the policy of the moment.

The framers deliberately divided governmental power among three separate branches because concentrated power is dangerous regardless of who exercises it. Judicial overreach is no less inconsistent with constitutional government than executive overreach or legislative overreach.

The Supreme Court’s decisions on immigration represent an encouraging course correction. They remind lower courts that judges are not policymakers. They reaffirm that immigration decisions belong principally to the elected branches. And they take another step toward restoring the proper constitutional balance among the three branches of government.

That is good news not only for immigration policy, but also for the Constitution itself.

Editor’s note: This article appeared originally at the American Mind.

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Judges now veto Trump prosecutors after the Senate stalls confirmations



One of the core executive powers is the authority to prosecute criminals. Article II of the Constitution assigns “the executive power” — all of it — to the president of the United States. In practice, the power to execute the laws against those who have violated them is delegated by the president to the attorney general, the Department of Justice she heads, and the 93 U.S. attorneys spread across the country.

Yet since he took office for the second time last January, President Trump and his attorney general, Pam Bondi, have had a heck of a time getting their people in place.

The criminal prosecution work of the US attorneys’ offices does not abate while Washington plays out its slow-walking games.

Of the roughly 50 U.S. attorney nominations the president has sent to the Senate, fewer than half — just 19 — had been confirmed by December 15, and all of those but three were confirmed en masse in October, some 10 months after Trump took office. Although another 13 were confirmed en masse on December 18, 14 are still awaiting confirmation as we approach the one-year mark of Trump’s second term.

A good bit of the holdup is caused by the Senate’s “blue-slip” process, whereby nominations will not be considered unless both senators from the nominee’s home state return a blue slip allowing the nominee to be considered.

Originally designed to allow input from the elected senators who presumably are most familiar with the nominee’s qualifications and temperament — the “advice” part of the “advice and consent” process mentioned in the Constitution — the refusal to return a blue slip has become an obstructionist tactic deployed by Democratic senators bent on blocking as much of Trump’s agenda as they can.

But the criminal prosecution work of the U.S. attorneys’ offices does not abate while Washington plays out its slow-walking games, and the president of the United States — the nation’s top executive and chief law enforcement officer, who has the constitutional duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” — needs to have people in charge of those offices.

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Democratic obstruction

The Constitution’s default rule for the appointment of U.S. attorneys is presidential nomination followed by Senate confirmation. But because U.S. attorneys are “inferior officers” in the Constitution’s language, Congress can allow for appointments by the president alone, by the heads of the executive departments, or by the courts of law. It has done so by allowing the attorney general to appoint “interim” U.S. attorneys for up to 120 days to fill vacancies.

But after the 120-day period expires, the interim can remain in charge of the office only if the district court in that jurisdiction approves. Six of the U.S. attorneys appointed to interim positions have been rejected by their respective district courts: Bill Essayli in the Central District of California, Julianne Murray in the District of Delaware, Sigal Chattah in the District of Nevada, Alina Habba in the District of New Jersey, Ryan Ellison in the District of New Mexico, and John Sarcone in the Northern District of New York. Not surprisingly, five of these district courts are overwhelmingly stacked with Democrat-appointed judges, another outgrowth of the more aggressive “blue-slip” policy that has been deployed by Democratic senators in the last decade.

The Nevada District Court has seven judges, for example, and all seven were appointed by either President Obama or President Biden. It’s the same situation with the Northern District of New York, where all five judges on that court were appointed by Obama or Biden. The New Jersey District Court has 17 judges, and all but two (both George W. Bush appointees, not Trump appointees) were appointed by either Obama or Biden. The Central District of California has 28 judges, and fewer than one-third were appointed by Republicans. And five of the seven federal judges in New Mexico were appointed by Obama or Biden.

Alina Habba, who brought the indictment against Rep. LaMonica McIver (D-N.J.) for interfering with Immigration and Customs Enforcement enforcement operations, was famously disqualified by the District Court in New Jersey after the cumulative 120-day period expired. And Lindsey Halligan — the interim U.S. attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia who obtained the high-profile indictments of former FBI Director James Comey for allegedly lying to Congress and of New York Attorney General Letitia James for allegedly falsely claiming a home in Virginia as her personal residence in order to obtain a more favorable mortgage interest rate — was disqualified by her local district court after the 120-day interim period in that office expired.

The bigger obstacle

The Department of Justice has said it will challenge these disqualifications on appeal. One issue will be whether the 120-day limit on the interim appointment authority is cumulative or successive. That is, if someone is appointed as interim U.S. attorney and then resigns before the expiration of the 120 days, does the attorney general get to appoint a new, different interim to fill the new vacancy for another 120 days, or does the new interim appointee only get to serve until the original 120-day clock expires?

The practice has been the latter, but that leaves the president without someone to exercise his executive authority in charge of the office, as long as the obstruction tactics in the Senate hold. That seems to be a big threat to the president’s ability to take care that the laws be faithfully executed and therefore a big Article II executive authority problem.

An even bigger obstacle for Trump, though one that has not received much attention, is the separation-of-powers problem lurking in this statutory scheme, which requires approval by the district court at the conclusion of the 120-day period.

Yes, the Constitution’s text allows for the appointment of inferior officers by the courts of law, which would technically allow Congress to create a scheme whereby the courts appoint the prosecutors who prosecute cases before them.

There is nothing in the records of sparse debate during the 1787 federal convention to suggest the drafters had such an interbranch appointment authority in mind however. Rather it would seem more likely that they intended inferior executive officers to be appointed by the president alone, or the heads of the executive departments, and inferior judicial officers to be appointed by the courts of law.

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When it upheld the independent prosecutor law in the 1988 case of Morrison v. Olson, which had provided for the appointment by a “Special Division” of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court rejected that interbranch argument, but it also pointed out that the independent prosecutor statute was designed to allow for investigation and prosecution of high-ranking officials in the executive branch, and the interbranch appointment process therefore avoided the obvious conflicts of interest.

No such conflict exists in the run-of-the-mill appointment (or rejection) by district courts of interim U.S. attorneys at the expiration of the 120-day interim period. The interbranch appointment authority raises serious separation-of-powers concerns, and the Supreme Court has been particularly solicitous of them in recent years. It also raises serious concerns about the president's ability to take care that the laws be faithfully executed when the people executing them are not the ones he has chosen.

A century ago, in the case of Humphrey’s Executor v. the United States, the Supreme Court upheld congressional restrictions on the ability of the president to remove executive branch officials. But already on the Supreme Court’s docket this term is a case, Trump v. Slaughter, in which most observers rightly predict that it will overrule that old, New Deal-era case and restore a large measure of control of the executive branch to the head of that branch, the president — the only member of the entire executive branch that we the people actually elect.

If the Slaughter case ends up slaughtering the bad constitutional law from Humphrey’s Executor, it does not take much imagination to conclude that the question of judges appointing prosecutors who appear before them — that is, those officials who exercise the core executive function of prosecuting crimes — should also be in for a very serious reconsideration.

Editor’s note: A version of this article appeared originally at the American Mind.

Who checks the judges? No one — and that’s the problem.



One would think a federal judge trying to block the president from deploying the National Guard to protect federal agents would mark the breaking point for judicial supremacism. Yet the Trump administration still behaves as if the Supreme Court can rescue it from judicial overreach. It cannot. You can’t comply your way out of judicial tyranny, appoint your way past it, or count on the high court to stop it. The judiciary must be delegitimized completely.

Congress passed by overwhelming margins a law banning Chinese-owned TikTok in the United States. President Trump ignored it. He ordered Attorney General Pam Bondi to keep the app online, and no one in Washington blinked. The president defied a duly enacted law, extended TikTok’s life beyond the 90-day limit, and still allows just under 20% Chinese ownership. Yet the same Washington class insists that any judge can command the president on immigration, national security, or even his use of the National Guard — and that such rulings are the word of God.

The proper response is not to plead for Supreme Court review — it’s to ignore such rulings outright.

Late Saturday night, U.S. District Judge Karin Immergut, a Trump appointee, ruled that the president lacked authority to deploy the Oregon National Guard to Portland to protect ICE facilities. The same judiciary that called a few hours of chaos on Jan. 6, 2021, an “insurrection” now dismisses eight months of rioting, doxxing, and targeted attacks on ICE agents as “lawful protest.”

On Sunday, Immergut extended her injunction to every state’s National Guard units, even those like Texas, whose governors had granted Trump permission to federalize.

The merits of her decision aren’t the core issue. The problem is structural: Federal courts claim abstract standing to decide national-security questions that belong to elected branches. Judicial power was never meant to work this way.

If a citizen suffers injury, he can seek damages in court. But no judge has constitutional authority to referee political disputes as if she were deciding some sort of civil case between Microsoft and Amazon. The proper response is not to plead for Supreme Court review — it’s to ignore such rulings outright.

If the judiciary holds the final say in every political or constitutional conflict, checks and balances collapse. When judges alone define their own powers and the limits of the other branches, we cease to be a republic and become an unelected oligarchy. Abraham Lincoln, citing Thomas Jefferson, warned that once a free people submits absolutely to any department of government, liberty is lost.

When one branch violates the Constitution, the others — and the people — must push back. The founders never vested final authority in any single branch, least of all the one insulated from elections. Presidents come and go; judges remain for decades, accountable to no voter.

I don’t like that Trump sets tariff rates and hands out exemptions by executive order. He even granted Qatar de facto NATO protection without Senate approval. Those moves deserve political resistance — but not judicial vetoes. Questions of national policy belong to voters and legislators, not to courts hunting for imaginary plaintiffs.

Immergut granted standing to Oregon and Portland to challenge Trump’s finding of a “violent domestic insurrection,” claiming there were only four clashes with federal officers in the prior month. Even if that number were correct, no judge has the power to second-guess an executive’s determination of an uprising. Governments cannot sue one another over political facts. We are either a constitutional republic or a dictatorship of robes.

The founders understood this. James Madison originally proposed that the Supreme Court share a “council of revision” with the president to veto legislation. Once the Constitution created an independent executive with its own veto, no serious thinker imagined adding a judicial one. In 1789, Madison made clear that while courts interpret law in specific cases, no branch “draws from the Constitution greater powers than another in marking out the limits of the several departments.”

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When branches clash, each uses its own powers to persuade the public. Madison wrote that differences between the legislative and executive “may be an inconvenience not entirely to be avoided.” That friction, he said, reflects the “concurrent right to expound the Constitution.” In other words, conflict is not a crisis — it’s republican government at work.

Today’s judicial supremacy replaces that rough balance with North Korean-style obedience to unelected authority. What’s next? Will judges write the 2026 federal budget while the president and Senate argue?

Waiting for the Supreme Court to reverse rogue lower-court rulings is a fool’s errand. As Justice Samuel Alito warned in Trump v. CASA, class-action suits and nationwide injunctions make such limits meaningless. Even if the high court eventually reverses Immergut, the administration will have wasted precious time and capital — while worse precedents, like birthright citizenship rulings, remain untouched.

How far must this usurpation go before the executive reasserts its authority? Until the presidency and Congress together reject the judiciary’s false supremacy, the United States will remain trapped in a system unworthy of a free people.

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