Recent speculation suggests Donald Trump may withdraw from NATO, while few have explored the reasons he might pursue that path.
Yes, abandoning America's longtime security framework in Europe aligns with promises to cut spending and avoid foreign entanglements — but the motivations run deeper than that.
If the US is moving toward a more transactional foreign policy, then keeping Turkey happy makes sense, especially if it means limiting Russian-Chinese influence in Central Asia.
It's about restructuring the global order.
The U.S. is pivoting toward a more transparently transactional alliance system, one centered on regional powers that can do the heavy lifting while Washington plays arbiter.
The new security and economic bloc forming before our eyes looks like it will involve Russia, Turkey, and Israel.
These are not natural allies in the traditional sense, but they each serve a role in what is shaping up to be a strategic trade-off:
Greece, Armenia, and even Ukraine, meanwhile, are looking more and more like sacrificial pawns in this reshuffling.
Trump has never cared for NATO’s obsession with Ukraine, and he’s likely to cut a deal that brings the war with Russia to an end.
The most probable outcome would be a mineral rights agreement where Russia officially consolidates its control over Eastern Ukraine while the United States walks away with access to key resources and a stabilized energy market.
The war-fatigued West will be sold this as a win ("Trump ended the war!") but in reality, it will be the moment Washington moves past its commitments to Eastern Europe and onto bigger plans.
This wouldn’t just be a settlement on Ukraine. It would also serve as the foundation for a broader U.S.-Russia understanding. Russia’s ultimate goal is to weaken NATO’s grip over its near abroad. If Washington gives signals that it won’t interfere in Armenia, Georgia, or even parts of Eastern Europe, Moscow will have no reason to keep its old hostility toward America.
Then, we have Turkey. Recent rumors that Trump would shut down a U.S. military base in Greece have yet to come to pass. Still, they reflect the region's anxiety concerning Trump's affinity for Turkish President Recep Erdoğan.
Erdoğan has always wanted a freer hand in the Aegean, where Greece controls a massive exclusive economic zone and the most important shipping lanes in the region. If Washington tacitly allows Turkey to pressure Greece, it clears the way for a major shift in power.
At the same time, Israel is tied up in the energy game with Greece through a pipeline linking the two. If Turkey’s aggressive posturing disrupts that project, Israel may find itself needing to recalibrate its alliances.
That’s where we come in. America can broker an arrangement where Israel and Turkey, which have been exchanging fighting words over Palestine for the last year and a half, find common ground, possibly at Greece’s expense.
This isn’t far-fetched. Turkey has been a problem for NATO for years, and yet Washington keeps it close because of its strategic importance.
If the U.S. is moving toward a more transactional foreign policy, then keeping Turkey happy makes sense, especially if it means limiting Russian-Chinese influence in Central Asia.
Meanwhile, the West is playing Armenia much like it played Ukraine: dangling EU integration, offering economic deals, and encouraging a break from Russia.
But just like Ukraine, Armenia is expendable. If war breaks out again with Azerbaijan, Armenia will be on its own, isolated from Russia and surrounded by hostile powers.
Here’s the likely scenario: The war starts, and Armenia holds out for a while, but without serious backing, it eventually loses key territory, most importantly the southern region of Syunik.
Then, as with Ukraine, America steps in as the “peacemaker” and negotiates a deal.
The price? Armenia gives up Syunik, allowing Turkey and Azerbaijan to finally complete the Zangezur corridor, uniting the Turkic world from Anatolia to Central Asia.
This would be a geopolitical earthquake. Turkey and Azerbaijan would gain unprecedented control over trade and energy flows, and a new power bloc would emerge stretching across the Caspian.
At first glance, a U.S.-backed Pan-Turanic expansion sounds counterintuitive, but it actually aligns with Washington’s shift toward an interest-based alliance system. A consolidated Turkic bloc led by Turkey, stretching from Anatolia through Azerbaijan and into Central Asia, would serve as a counterbalance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It would give the U.S. leverage over key trade routes while keeping both Russia and China in check.
At the same time, this would spell the end for Armenia as we know it. A landlocked state already struggling to maintain relevance would be completely isolated, boxed in by adversaries, and left with little recourse but to accept a diminished future. The EU’s empty promises won’t save Armenia. If anything, they will only push it further into the abyss.
Winners:
Losers:
If Trump follows through on withdrawing from NATO, it won’t be the end of U.S. influence. It will simply be the beginning of a new grand strategy.
The post-1945 world order was built on ideological alliances and the “rules-based order." The next era will be about raw, transparently strategic interests. America doesn’t need NATO if it can secure influence through regional power deals.
Armenia, Greece, and Ukraine are all at risk of being left behind in this transformation. The West no longer fights for weak states unless it directly benefits from doing so. The game is changing, and the players who don’t recognize the shift will be the ones who suffer the most.
The croissant isn’t French — it’s an Austrian culinary rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. Since the 13th century, Austrian bakers have been shaping the croissant’s predecessor, the crescent-shaped kipferl, mimicking the Ottoman moon, which, according to popular lore, was used to celebrate the Habsburgs' final standoff against Turkish invaders after the Battle of Vienna in 1683.
Austria’s long-standing defiance against the Turks is as integral to its national identity as Charlemagne’s victory over the Muslim Moors is to France. As Christendom’s last line of defense against Islamic expansion into Europe, Austria held the line. Yet today, Turkish kebab shops fill nearly every street in central Vienna, competing with bakeries that once symbolized the Ottoman Empire’s defeat. The contrast is striking.
Parallel societies will inevitably form without a clear path for immigrants to adopt a national identity.
The Turkish community has become Austria’s largest minority. As of 2023, approximately 500,000 residents of Turkish origin live in the country, a sharp rise from 39,000 in 2001 — a 1,200% increase.
Does this shift reflect modern-day “tolerance” ending nearly 1,000 years of imperial rivalry, or are deeper forces at work?
Popular explanations of Europe’s recent mass migration credit events like the Syrian war in 2015 or the siege of Sarajevo in the 1990s, which prompted waves of asylum-seekers. However, mass migration in Austria dates back to the aftermath of World War II, when the country lay in rubble with a diminished male population.
To rebuild, Austria sought foreign workers. With the Iron Curtain blocking labor from Eastern Europe, the former Catholic empire turned to its historical rival across the Bosphorus. Austria actively recruited Turkish workers in the following decades, promising employment and economic opportunities.
One local Turkish resident, Metin, remembers, as a child in the 1980s, seeing Austrian embassy billboards in Istanbul promoting jobs and benefits — a golden ticket. Like tens of thousands of others, his family eagerly accepted the offer. However, both Austrians and Turks miscalculated. Austrians assumed the Turks would return home when the job was over. The Turks believed they would be welcomed in their new land. Neither were correct.
“I quickly realized that I wasn’t wanted,” Metin recounted. “My work was wanted, but I wasn’t.”
What started as a temporary workforce has transformed Austria. Turks have established their own parallel society, which continues to grow in influence and numbers. Today, Muslim immigrants, particularly from Turkey, are surpassing Austrians in birth rates while preserving a strong religious and cultural identity from their home country.
Meanwhile, the once-Catholic imperial stronghold is becoming increasingly secular, stepping away from the faith that once defined its national identity. This demographic shift has profound implications — not just for Austria but for all of Europe.
The United States can learn valuable lessons from countries that have dealt with mass migration for generations. Today, 14.9% of the U.S. population is foreign-born, the highest percentage since the immigration surge of 1910.
While left-leaning arguments favor foreign workers to boost the economy, the long-term challenges cannot be ignored. Postwar Austria may have benefited from such policies, but history shows that immigration requires more than economic justification — it demands integration and assimilation.
As Turkish-born Metin warns, welcoming workers means welcoming people. Parallel societies will inevitably form without a clear path for immigrants to adopt a national identity. At best, they may coexist peacefully, leaving the long-term impact dependent on demographics. At worst, clashing cultural norms could threaten national cohesion for generations.
The United States holds a key advantage over Austria in shaping national identity. Unlike European nations, which often tie identity to ethnic heritage, America, for good or ill, does allow for hyphenated identities, such as African-American or Mexican-American. In Austria, one is either Turkish or Austrian — there is no equivalent of a blended national identity. As a result, Turks and Austrians live as separate cultures rather than uniting around shared ideals. Over time, Austria’s future will not be determined by external threats but by shifting demographics within its borders.
America’s strength lies in its ability to forge a national identity independent of ethnicity. In theory, people from all backgrounds can participate in the American experiment, but assimilation does not happen automatically. If we continue to welcome immigrants, we must also provide the framework for integration — otherwise, we risk facing the same challenges Austria now confronts.
Now that Donald Trump has successfully mounted his political comeback and is set to become the 47th president of the United States, we can finally look forward to seeing how he’ll handle his long list of agenda items for his upcoming administration: inflation, immigration, energy, crime.
He’s got his hands full.
Both Israel and Turkey are aligned when it comes to sending money and arms to Azerbaijan for the express purpose of whittling the already-tiny Republic of Armenia down to nothing.
But for now, let’s focus on his foreign policy — particularly how he’s going to tackle the increasingly complicated situation developing in Israel and the rest of the Middle East.
Trump has come out firmly in support of Israel in the state’s crusade against Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and the rest of Iran’s proxy terrorist network. But the rhetoric that’s come from both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu oversimplifies the situation.
America and Israel are the good guys.
Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah are the bad guys.
That’s been the framing of the situation from GOP establishmentarians. Simple, yet effective.
But it’s nowhere near as simple as that, and Trump’s recent moves have actually complicated his commitment to that framing as well.
You see, the Middle East is, in reality, a smorgasbord of shifting, overlapping, crisscrossing alliances. And that’s because there is so much ethnic and religious diversity within this pocket of the world.
Contrary to common Western perception, the Middle East is not one big, brown, Muslim monolith. The Turks are not the Sunni Arabs, who aren’t the Shiite Persians, who aren’t the Christian Armenians, who aren’t the somewhat secular, somewhat Islamic Azeris, who aren’t the Maronite Lebanese, who aren’t the Coptic Egyptians.
Each one of these groups vary drastically from one another in ethnicity, culture, and religion. And therefore, there’s no clear-cut demarcation in the Middle East when it comes to political alliances. Or at least, there’s not a simple “good guys vs. bad guys” heuristic that can be used to assess the situation.
And yet, that’s the framing American foreign policy and media sticks with: "The Middle East is full of Muslim bad guys (who are all the same), and we need to protect the lone Judeo-Christian oasis of democracy in the Middle East."
Our once and future president did something recently that slightly undermined the legitimacy of that framing.
In the days leading up to his election, Trump announced his commitment to aiding Christians in the Middle East who had been victims of Islamic persecution. Specifically, he was referring to the 120,000 Armenians who had been ethnically cleansed from their historic homeland of Artsakh by Azerbaijan.
He even went so far as calling the patriarch of the Armenian Apostolic Church, his holiness Aram I, about mobilizing an Armenian restoration of Artsakh.
From where I’m sitting, this is a clear result of Trump having surrounded himself with advisors like Robert F Kennedy Jr., Vivek Ramaswamy, and Tulsi Gabbard, all of whom have all made statements signaling their support for Armenia against its various regional antagonists.
But the simple act of signaling a commitment to aiding the Christian Armenians actually creates a flurry of complications for the Trump administration.
And it all has to do with the love triangle between the U.S., Israel, and Turkey.
As the entire world knows, Israel launched a war in Gaza after the brutal October 7 attacks by Hamas.
What much of the world doesn’t know is that at the time of the attacks, Israel was already embroiled in a different conflict, aiding (along with the U.S. State Department) in its ethnic cleansing campaign against the Armenian enclave of Artsakh.
And just one week after the October 7 attacks, a shipment of arms left Tel Aviv headed toward Baku, Azerbaijan.
And Israel has not relented. In the midst of all the bombs Israel has dropped on both Gaza and Lebanon, it (along with Turkey) continues to send state-of-the-art weaponry to Azerbaijan, most recently on September 24.
If you’ve kept up with the news, you also know that there’s been a fair bit of saber-rattling between Turkey and Israel, as Turkish President Erdogan has been raising tensions with Israel for its offensive against Hamas, recently going so far as hailing the ICC decision to issue arrest warrants for Israeli leaders as “courageous” and hosting Hamas in Turkey after the terrorist group was booted from Qatar.
It certainly seems like the Islamic Turks are egging on a war with Israel from the outside.
But how much of this is theater?
After all, Israel relies on Turkey and Azerbaijan for 40% of its oil via the BTC Pipeline (which begins in Baku and ends in Ceyhan, Turkey).
And, as I already mentioned, both Israel and Turkey are aligned when it comes to sending money and arms to Azerbaijan for the express purpose of whittling the already-tiny Republic of Armenia down to nothing.
But that still doesn’t cover the total extent of Israel’s antagonistic relationship with Armenians.
You see, the state of Israel isn’t just home to Jews and Muslims. It’s home to about 187,000 Christians, some 5,000 of whom are Armenian. In Jerusalem, the Old City has historically been divided into four quarters: the Christian quarter, Jewish quarter, Muslim quarter, and the Armenian quarter.
While this Armenian community dates back to the 4th century, it has recently found itself under siege by a shadowy Israeli corporation called Xana Capital. In dispute is the "Cow's Garden," the last large, open space in Jerusalem's Old City. In 2021, the Armenian patriarchate agreed to a secret 98-year lease of the land — which comprises 25% of the Armenian quarter, to a Jewish-Australian developer.
Calling the lease illegal, the community has been fighting to invalidate it in court. Meanwhile, the Grayzone reports that Xana Capital has employed Israeli settlers to intimidate Armenians into vacating the land.
The point I’m making is that the framing of the Israel-Palestine conflict since the 10/7 attacks has been that Israel has been in a fight for its survival against the bloodthirsty Muslims and therefore needs as much aid and support from the U.S. as it can muster.
But there's one glaring flaw in that narrative: Israel’s direct involvement in the downfall of the Armenian state and diaspora.
To recap:
Israel has been sending arms to Azerbaijan, before, during, and after October 7.
Israel is currently confiscating the historic Armenian quarter of Jerusalem.
All of this is happening in the midst of its crusade against Hamas and Hezbollah.
My question is: When is the United States going to prioritize Christians in the Middle East priority over the other two Abrahamic faiths? We’re a Christian country, right?
This is why Trump’s pre-election commitments to Christians in the Middle East is a complicated matter. It’s not as simple as “Muslims bad, Israel good.”
As I mentioned, Trump seems to be stacking his cabinet with pro-Armenia advocates (RFK Jr., Vivek, Tulsi, even Marco Rubio). But he’s also got plenty of pro-Israel people (Elise Stefanik, Kristi Noem, Lee Zeldin, Mike Huckabee, Susie Wiles, Pete Hegseth, and, yes, even Marco Rubio) in the mix. Not to mention the pro-Turkey Dr. Oz as head of Medicare and Medicaid.
So for now, it looks like it’ll be a bumpy ride.
In a post-election interview with Tucker Carlson, RFK, Jr. recounted the time he witnessed Trump draw from memory an accurate map of the Middle East, including troop strength of each country. It’s apparent from this one exchange that Trump has a sharp understanding of the geopolitical and strategic military dynamics of the Middle East.
This means he also knows that stability in the region can never be taken for granted. I would urge him to look at the movements happening between Israel, Turkey, and Azerbaijan and take stock of the Pan-Turanic vision being cooked up by these parties.
If he’s serious about helping the Christians of the Middle East, there’s no getting around it.
Discussing politics on Thanksgiving is a tradition that many of us could live without but can’t seem to get away from. It’s especially poignant every four years after the tidal shifts accompanying presidential elections. This year, we saw remarkable outcomes, most notably that voters prioritized bringing down the cost of their Thanksgiving meal over bringing the family together for a civil conversation.
OK, that is an oversimplification, but let’s take a look at the numbers.
Clearly, voters were less concerned about civility than they were about costs.
The two of us, a Republican and a Democrat, have been conducting polling together around civility in our political discourse for decades. For the last five years, we’ve partnered with the Georgetown Institute of Politics and Public Service to dive into just what this means for the state of our politics. We conducted our most recent poll of 800 likely voters right after the outcomes of the 2024 elections. We asked voters which candidate they believed ran a more divisive campaign, who messaged the ability to get things done more effectively, which candidate they thought represented their shared values the best, and much more.
We learned that many voters found Vice President Harris to be someone who is a unifier and ran a less negative campaign as opposed to President Trump, but President Trump had advantages in key areas that propelled him over the top. He was able to effectively message himself as the candidate who addressed the kitchen table issues that most stood out to voters. We’ve seen in exit poll after exit poll that the economy was the issue most on people’s minds on Election Day, and when you look at our findings, you see a pattern that reflects Trump’s win.
When voters were asked, “Which candidate is talking to you about this issue?” we see some of the dynamics in the race represented. Vice President Harris outperformed President Trump in addressing abortion, protecting democracy, sharing my values, and caring about people like me. Fifty-two percent found that Vice President Harris was the candidate who better messaged bringing the country together.
Conversely, voters found that President Trump more effectively talked about the economy, inflation, and immigration, and a majority thought he would be better at getting things done, but most do not expect him to be a unifier in the White House.
Clearly, voters were less concerned about civility than they were about costs. The overall outcome has surprisingly resulted in a drop in political tensions based on the measure we have used for the last five years — largely driven by Republicans who are feeling relief after Election Day.
We measure tension by asking folks where they feel the country is on a scale of one to 100, with one being no division at all and 100 being civil war. We saw a four-point drop since our last poll in March from 70 to 66, the lowest mark in the last five years that we have done this poll. Division scores are highest among Democrats at 70, while independents are at about the total sample’s mean (66) and Republicans see the least division (61). These scores reflect a significant 14-point drop for Republicans, specifically from March, with independents remaining largely the same and Democrats seeing a small, two-point uptick.
Of particular note is the hope respondents share about a brighter future and the possibilities of collaboration between the parties. Despite President Trump’s “trifecta" control, 95% of those polled agreed with the statement, “I want President Trump, Republicans in Congress, and Democrats in Congress to work together to solve the major problems facing this country.” Also, 82% of respondents agreed, “It will be good for the country if President Trump and Congress compromise to find solutions even if this means I will not always get everything I want.”
In what could be a reflection of these hopes, when asked how much division they expect in the country a year from now, respondents predicted a 61 out of 100, a more than 12-point decrease led largely by Republicans in projected division from September 2023.
So how does this impact your Thanksgiving meal this year? Prices are projected to drop this year, pretty significantly, dropping nearly $10 compared to this time last year, when the average cost for a Thanksgiving meal was $67.84, all the way to $58.08. Your Republican relative might take a minute to brag that this is the market reacting to President Trump’s win, but your Democrat relative might say that it’s a sign that Bidenomics is working and the country went down the wrong path on Election Day.
Either way, we know that politics will be debated this Thanksgiving in many homes across the country. We only hope that it’s a little more civil this time around.
Editor’s note: This article was originally published by RealClearPolitics and made available via RealClearWire.
In a largely congenial pre-Thanksgiving press conference, Karine Jean-Pierre served the White House press corps a turkey dinner and expressed her gratitude for all the media have done for the Biden-Harris administration over the past four years. “Thank you. No, really, I mean that,” Jean-Pierre, who was wearing a tall, black pilgrim hat, gushed from […]
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