‘I’ll Have To Fire Him’: Trump Won’t End Probe, Says Fed Chair Must Step Down Or Else
'I want to be uncontroversial'
The independence of the Federal Reserve System has become a major source of public controversy. As political leaders signal dissatisfaction with monetary policy, officials and commentators rush to defend the central bank’s insulation from democratic pressure. We are told, as if it were self-evident, that central bank independence is a pillar of sound economic governance.
But this confidence is misplaced. The economic case for central bank independence is far weaker than its defenders suggest. And the constitutional case is weaker still.
Officials entrusted with such consequential authority must ultimately answer to elected leadership.
Start with economics. The standard argument is that independent central banks deliver low and stable inflation because they are insulated from short-term political incentives. Elected officials, facing electoral pressures, might be tempted to juice the economy with artificially loose monetary policy. By contrast, independent technocrats can take the long view.
Early empirical studies did show that countries with independent central banks experienced lower inflation. Yet more recent research has cast doubt on this relationship. The correlation is sensitive to different samples and methods. In many cases, the supposed benefits of independence disappear entirely.
A more plausible explanation has emerged. Countries that enjoy low and stable inflation share deeper institutional characteristics: respect for the rule of law, stable political systems, and credible commitments to property rights. These are the real foundations of sound money. Central bank independence accompanies these basic governance norms, but its stand-alone effect is debatable.
This matters for a free-enterprise economy. Monetary policy is not a neutral technocratic exercise. Interest rates are prices: the price of time, risk, and capital. When insulated officials tinker with those prices at their discretion, the result is distorted market signals. Cheap credit can mislead investors, encourage unsustainable projects, and redistribute wealth in opaque ways. Independence does not eliminate politics. It simply hides politics behind a veil of expertise.
If the economic case for independence is overstated, the constitutional case is entirely bunk. The Constitution is clear: Congress holds the power “to coin Money” and “regulate the Value thereof.” Monetary authority, like all legislative power, originates with the people’s representatives. Congress may delegate certain functions to administrative bodies, including by creating a central bank. But delegation is not abdication.
Those who exercise delegated authority remain accountable to the laws Congress passes and, ultimately, to the chief executive charged with enforcing them.
Yet the modern Fed operates as if our constitutional framework were irrelevant. Its leaders enjoy significant protection from removal. Its decisions (targeting interest rates, allocating credit, regulating banks, etc.) have sweeping consequences for the entire economy. If this does not constitute the exercise of executive power, it is hard to say what does.
The Supreme Court has recently emphasized that administrative agencies cannot be insulated from presidential oversight simply because they possess technical expertise. The separation of powers does not yield to convenience, nor to the promise of better policy outcomes. Yet when it comes to the Federal Reserve, the court has signaled a willingness to tolerate precisely such insulation — a “special case” for the most powerful economic institution in the country.
This exception is indefensible. Appeals to history or prudence, however well grounded, are not constitutional arguments. An agency that wields executive power must answer to the chief executive. Concerns about how that works in practice does not justify ignoring the Constitution.
The truth is that central bank independence persists not because it is firmly grounded in law or economics, but because the alternative unsettles us. We worry, not without reason, that elected officials might misuse monetary policy for short-term gain.
But the Constitution does not permit us to resolve that fear by concentrating vast economic power in the hands of unaccountable experts. A free and self-governing people must confront the difficult task of designing institutions that combine competence with accountability.
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That begins with Congress. There are several legislative reforms that can restore the rule of law to monetary policy. First, lawmakers should narrow the Federal Reserve’s mandate to a single, clear objective — price stability — rather than the vague and conflicting goals it currently pursues. A simpler mandate would make it easier to evaluate performance and hold policymakers responsible when they fail.
Second, Congress should revisit the legal protections that shield senior Fed officials from removal. Freedom of judgment is one thing; freedom from oversight is another. Officials entrusted with such consequential authority must ultimately answer to elected leadership. Legislators ought to make it easier to fire central bankers.
Finally, the president should take a more active role in ensuring that the Fed operates within its statutory and constitutional bounds. This does not mean dictating day-to-day interest rate decisions. Instead, it means recognizing that monetary policy, like all exercises of government power, must remain subject to democratic control.
President Trump’s nomination of Kevin Warsh as the next Fed chairman is a good start. The two must work together to restore the Fed’s ordinary day-to-day operations, something missing since the 2007-08 financial crisis.
Economic stability is obviously desirable. But we cannot purchase it at the cost of self-government. Republican principles require officials to be answerable to the people. If we are serious about preserving the constitutional order and free enterprise, we must abandon the comforting myths of central bank independence and restore accountability to the Federal Reserve.
Editor’s note: This article appeared originally at the American Mind.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics released its Consumer Price Index for the month of January, and it showed annualized inflation dropping to 2.4 percent for the 12 months ending in January, down from 2.7 percent for the 12 months ending in December.
The post Lower Inflation Keeps Surprising the Clueless Media appeared first on .
President Donald Trump has officially selected Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell’s successor.
Trump nominated Kevin Warsh for the role, noting the financier’s extensive experience, including his former role as a governor on the board of the Federal Reserve. At the time of Warsh’s appointment to the board in 2006, he was 35, the youngest appointee to serve, Trump claimed.
This announcement comes after a longtime feud between 'numbskull' Powell and the president.
Warsh is set to replace Powell in May after Powell's term officially ends.
"I have known Kevin for a long period of time, and have no doubt that he will go down as one of the GREAT Fed Chairmen, maybe the best," Trump said in a Truth Social post Friday. "On top of everything else, he is 'central casting,' and he will never let you down.”
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This announcement comes after a longtime feud between "numbskull" Powell and the president, with Trump often criticizing Powell's refusal to cut interest rates.
This conflict came to a fever pitch when Trump's Department of Justice launched a criminal investigation into Powell over his testimony to the Senate Banking Committee in June 2025, when he discussed the ballooning cost of renovation to the Fed headquarters.
In a statement following the subpoena, Powell claimed the investigation was actually a political response to "whether the Fed will be able to continue to set interest rates based on evidence and economic conditions — nor whether instead monetary policy will be directed by political pressure or intimidation."

Trump was originally considering National Economic Council Director Kevin Hassett for the role, but later suggested he would pick someone else because he wanted to keep Hassett in his position.
"[There] was great speculation that highly respected Kevin Hassett was going to be named Chairman of the Fed, and a great Chairman he would have been but, quite honestly, he is doing such an outstanding job working with me and my team at the White House, that I just didn’t want to let him go," Trump wrote in a Truth Social post.
"Kevin is indescribably good so, as the expression goes, 'if you can’t do better, don’t try to fix it!' Thank you Kevin for doing such a great job!"
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You won’t hear many people object to President Trump’s executive order to ban corporate purchases of residential homes. The idea sounds like common sense. But it targets a minor symptom while leaving the real disease untouched — and in some respects, it risks making that disease worse.
Institutional home-buying already peaked during the COVID-era bubble and has receded since then. In most markets, corporate ownership represents a small share of total inventory. Even at its height, it never explained why housing costs exploded for everyone else. High prices created the opportunity for institutional buyers, not the other way around.
The goal should not be cheaper debt. It should be cheaper homes.
Government policy inflated the housing market. Institutional buyers simply responded.
During COVID, the Federal Reserve pushed interest rates toward zero. Mortgage rates fell below 3%. At the same time, the Fed bought roughly $2.7 trillion in mortgage-backed securities, and HUD expanded “affordable homeownership” programs that widened the pool of subsidized buyers. Those policies produced predictable results.
When the government offers 2.5% interest for 30 years — often paired with minimal down payments backed by the FHA — buyers flood the market. Sellers respond by raising prices. The bubble becomes a feature, not a bug.
Institutional buyers entered that environment because it looked like easy money. Higher home prices also pushed rents up, so developers built more homes for long-term rental. Both trends flowed from the same source: a government-shaped market that made housing unaffordable, then subsidized the unaffordability.
Trump now seems focused on the symptom — corporate buyers — while ignoring the machinery that inflated the market in the first place.
He has spent months fighting Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell to bring rates back down toward zero. Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve still holds about $2.1 trillion in mortgage-backed securities. Trump has also announced a plan for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase another $200 billion in MBS. The stated goal is to lower mortgage rates.
But the goal should not be cheaper debt. It should be cheaper homes.

Artificially lowering rates props up prices and slows correction. Prices in many markets have begun to soften. That correction should continue. Policies designed to suppress rates will keep prices elevated and risk inflating the next bubble.
That brings us back to corporate home-buying. Even at the COVID peak, institutional buyers — defined as entities owning at least 100 single-family homes — owned about 3.1% of the housing stock. That number has since fallen to around 1%. Investors see the market turning, and they have started backing away.
So Trump’s corporate-purchase ban arrives late, targets a relatively small share of the market, and risks becoming cosmetic cover for policies that keep the bubble inflated.
If Trump wants to drive prices down and permanently realign housing with median incomes, he has to reverse the policies that inflated the bubble. That means attacking the structure, not the headline.
Get government out of the mortgage market. Trump’s next Federal Reserve chair must commit to unwinding the Fed’s mortgage-backed securities portfolio. That $2.1 trillion cushion keeps mortgage rates lower than the market would otherwise set. Those artificially low rates inflate home prices.
End universal “homeownership for everyone” policy. The federal government keeps subsidizing buyers who are not ready to buy. Those programs inject cash into housing demand that would not exist in a real market. The goal should align prices with income, not chase a utopian dream of universal ownership. After decades of subsidies, deductions, and federal credit support, the home ownership rate still sits around the mid-60% range.
Stop chasing near-zero interest rates. A 30-year loan at 2% sounds appealing until you realize what it does to prices. Cheap money bids up homes across the board. Buyers pay the price forever even as politicians brag about the “deal.” Trump should let the market set rates. Recent rate cuts have not restored normal home buying either. Sales remain weak because prices remain too high.
End the 30-year fixed mortgage. Instead of floating longer loans — 50 years? Madness! — the country should move in the opposite direction. Before the New Deal era, short-term mortgages, often three to seven years, dominated the market. Federal policy transformed that structure.
Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the National Housing Act of 1934, establishing the Federal Housing Authority. The FHA insured long-term, fully amortizing mortgages with fixed rates, low down payments, and standardized payment schedules. That system moved the market away from short-term balloon loans and laid the foundation for longer terms.
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Congress eventually authorized the 30-year mortgage in 1954. VA loans under the GI Bill and the expansion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac later built a secondary market that made long-term fixed-rate loans attractive to lenders.
Government insurance, guarantees, and liquidity support made 30-year fixed mortgages feasible, which is why they represent 80%-90% of U.S. mortgages today. Without those interventions, lenders would not carry that risk.
The larger point remains simple: Sellers can’t charge prices buyers can’t pay. Prices explode only when government subsidies and government-backed long-term debt expand what buyers can “afford” on paper.
Unwind the subsidies. Unwind the guarantees. Unwind the cheap-money machinery. Let incomes, not federal policy, set the ceiling.
Housing should function like other consumer markets, not be engineered by Washington. Prices should reflect what people earn.
That’s the fix. Everything else treats symptoms and pretends to solve the problem.